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Turkey’s recent slide into authoritarianism will have implications for its close 
neighbours in the West. Especially Greece cannot avoid negative spill-over effects. A 
coalition government comprising Syriza and Independent Greeks does not have an 
unconstrained set of policy choices in responding to this. Maintaining effective 
working relations is a paramount interest but achieving this is easier in principle than 
in practice especially considering the issues of asylum seekers and Turkish 
revisionism on the Lausanne Treaty. Unlike the two parties that dominated the Greek 
political scene after 1974, PASOK and New Democracy, the current government has 
little experience navigating choppy diplomatic seas with Turkey.  
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The implications for accession to the European Union (EU) notwithstanding, observers of 
Turkey’s current period of political instability have paid scant attention to the constraints and 
opportunities that will shape the policy response of close neighbours, Greece in particular. 
This is puzzling, given that the July 2016 coup attempt, the subsequent purges and crackdown 
on dissent, and the sanctioning of a powerful executive presidency alla Turca in the April 
2017 referendum pose very real challenges for policymakers in neighbouring states and the 
Mediterranean region more generally (Tziampiris 2016).  
 
Once seen by European actors as the answer to Turkey’s long-standing ‘reformist deficit’, 
today the ruling AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/ Justice and Development Party) has 
increasingly turned to undemocratic measures to cling to power (Baser and Öztürk 2017). 
Most were willing at first to turn a blind eye to this shift but after the 2007 elections, criticism 
and rebukes from Turkey’s European partners increased noticeably. Some in the press 
(Tisdall 2018) and Europe’s political class went so far as to label Turkey a dictatorship in the 
making. Given the fluid context, to date little scholarly consensus has emerged regarding the 
precise bearing that Turkey’s new political configuration will have on its Western 
neighbours.  
 
Although some argue that Turkey’s political turmoil will eventually bring negative spill-over 
effects for Greece, others have interpreted instability in Turkey as good news. For instance, 
Konstandaras (2016) has argued, rather optimistically, that Greece will emerge as a kind of 
strategic anchor of stability in the region, opening up the prospect of negotiating a new deal 
for support and debt relief from the EU. He claims Greece has and will continue to benefit 
from the tourism share that Turkey has ceded in recent years. Others such as Roussanoglou 
(2017) believe Greece is well-positioned to capture the lion’s share of ‘capital flight’ from 
Turkey if current conditions worsen. Roussanoglou’s report (2017) that increasing numbers 
of Turkish citizens are acquiring property in Greece underscores this point.  
 
Irrespective of whether these positives transpire, Greece cannot escape the fact that the 
refugee/migration issue will continue to pose a monumental challenge. The potential influx of 
yet more refugees from Syria, but also from Africa and the Middle East (and even Turks 
themselves), looms on the horizon – in case of collapse of the Turkey-EU refugee deal – 
bringing devastating effects upon Greece (Bilgic and Pace 2017; Bialasiewicz and Maessen 
2018), while Turkey’s discursive revival of historic disputes such as Lausanne hangs like a 
 3 
sword of Damocles over its head. Therefore, Greece needs to keep a delicate balance between 
Turkey and its commitment to democratic values and human rights.  
 
Studying relations between the two countries became all the more interesting when President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Greece in early December 2017, the first Turkish president to 
do so in 65 years. The meeting was nevertheless not free from tensions; as the The New York 
Times (Kitsantonis and Gall 2017) put it, it turned into a verbal theatre of war when Erdoğan 
crossed an array of red lines. Turkish policymakers had already been mentioning their 
discontent with the Lausanne Treaty for a while, however remarks regarding discussion of the 
treaty became all the more frequent after the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, when Greece 
started receiving a high number of asylum seekers from Turkey, some of whom had allegedly 
taken part in the putsch. Thus, the meeting between Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister 
Alexis Tsipras was turned into a platform where the dormant tensions between the two 
countries were revived.  
 
In this article, we analyse the impact of Turkey’s “exit from democracy” (Akkoyunlu and 
Öktem 2016), and/or “Erdoğan’s majoritarian drift” (Özbudun 2014) on Greek politics and in 
particular its foreign policy towards Turkey. We argue that Greece cannot avoid a number of 
negative spill-over effects that will require careful manoeuvring on the part of policymakers 
in Athens.  
 
First, the regime in Turkey is becoming more authoritarian and politics is increasingly 
informed by a public discourse that is less secular, less EU-oriented and more Islamic-
conservative and nationalist, at least in tone, if not in practice (Esen and Gumuscu 2016). 
Beyond that, as Çınar (2018) notes, the AKP regime, under the leadership of Erdoğan, has 
been trying to redefine the Turkish state identity and this redefinition process has been 
feeding on authoritarian practices. The coalition government in Athens comprising Syriza 
(Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás/Coalition of the Radical Left) – a radical-leftist-turned-
populist party – and Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Ellines, Anel), a populist radical right-
wing party, does not have an unlimited or unconstrained set of policy choices in responding 
to this. Maintaining effective working relations is a paramount interest for Greece but 
achieving this is easier in principle than in practice. It is necessary to understand what options 
a coalition government of leftists and nationalists in Greece has in maintaining effective 
working relations with an increasingly undemocratic neighbour.  
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Second, many educated, upper middle class Turkish citizens are fleeing Turkey (or 
contemplating to do so) due to fears their politics or lifestyle makes them a target of the state. 
Some have sought asylum in Greece; others are seeking to receive a golden visa through the 
purchase of property. This means that there is a Turkish diaspora in the making in Greece. 
Third, the thorny issue of Turkish military officers who were part of the coup attempt seeking 
political asylum in Greece will continue to strain Turkish-Greek relations for some time. And 
finally, Greece is the pivot point for the EU-Turkey refugee deal and any major shift in the 
agreed arrangement will impact Greece profoundly as it will have no choice but to adapt 
(Tziampiris 2016). Unlike the two parties that dominated the Greek political scene after 1974, 
PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima/Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and New 
Democracy (Nea Dimokratia, ND), the current government is not that experienced in 
navigating choppy diplomatic seas with Turkey. Therefore, the unfolding events will 
indisputably put the left-wing Syriza party’s commitment to human rights and leftist 
principles to the test. 
 
This article therefore contributes to the empirical literature on Greek-Turkish relations with a 
specific focus on the period that marks the democratic decline in Turkey. It aims to put 
emphasis on the Greek perspective on contemporary Turkish-Greek politics and to scrutinize 
how Greece reacts to this remarkable transformation period in Turkey. To lay out the context, 
the article begins with a brief survey of Turkey’s domestic politics and developments since 
the July 2016 coup attempt. It then focuses closely on the current structure of Greek domestic 
politics, detailing the factors that have shaped the position of Syriza (and to a lesser extent, 
that of its coalition partner, Anel) on Turkey’s domestic issues. The following section draws 
out some key implications of that analysis for Greek–Turkish diplomatic relations in the near 
term. It does so through the prism of two ‘hot’ issues: Turkish asylum seekers and Turkey’s 
revisionism regarding the Lausanne issue.  
 
A synopsis of Turkey’s authoritarian turn 
Since 2002, Turkey has been governed by a single-party government, an unparalleled 
development for a political system historically characterised by a weak and fragmented party 
system and long periods of unstable coalition government (Özbudun 2014). Since 2007 
especially, the ruling AKP and its indisputable leader, the current president, Erdoğan, have 
emerged as the most successful political actors in modern Turkish history. While initial high 
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hopes for democratic consolidation in Turkey were placed in Erdoğan (İnsel 2003), it is now 
abundantly clear that he and the party he leads have joined Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and 
Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége/Alliance of Young Democrats) and Russia’s Vladimir 
Putin and United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) in the early 21
st
 century club of right-wing, 
nationalist-populist regimes.  
 
Erdoğan has achieved this dubious honour largely by instrumentalizing successive political 
crises in Turkey (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016), including the bloody putsch on 15 July 2016. 
Five days after the coup attempt, the AKP government declared a three-month state of 
emergency, which was extended without interruption for two years. Under the cover of this 
state of emergency, Erdoğan and the AKP pursued a program of purges and a media clamp 
down intended to stifle opposition and reinforce the ruling party’s hegemony. The post-coup 
process then turned into a purge in massive scale by which all state institutions have 
gradually been ‘cleansed’ of dissident voices against the ruling party, most of whom 
belonged to the Gülen Movement.  
 
It is essential to know the complicated relationship between the Gülen Movement and the 
AKP to understand both Turkey’s authoritarian turn and the July 2016 coup attempt. Even 
though the Gülen Movement defines itself as an education-oriented transnational faith based 
on inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue, it also has para-political branches in the Turkish 
media, business networks and state structure which have always aimed to break the 
hegemonic role of Turkey’s historic Kemalist-secular establishment. Given this common 
objective, the Gülen Movement and the AKP created an informal coalition and together 
eliminated most of Turkey’s establishment between 2007 and 2013. After that, however, they 
found themselves in a power and interest-based conflict as to who would be the decision-
maker regarding the future and identity of the Turkish state.  
 
In this regard, while the AKP started to terrorise the Movement and banned its institutions 
and associations, the Movement tried to demonstrate that the AKP is an illegitimate and 
corrupt political structure by using its national and international media power and human 
capital within the Turkish bureaucracy, legal system and police structures. As a result, the 
AKP increased its authoritarian practices towards all opposition groups with the justification 
of defending the country against the ‘enemies of the state’. The coup attempt was the last 
drop in this process since the Gülen Movement, or at least some of its important elements and 
 6 
members were involved in it (Watmough and Öztürk 2018). Yet, the rulers of the ‘new 
Turkey’ have preferred not to punish solely the perpetrators of the putsch. Instead, they have 
instrumentalised the coup atmosphere to purge almost all members of the Gülen Movement 
and the most significant opposition groups, such as secular academics, Kurds and human 
right activists in the Turkish socio-political arena. 
 
As Milan (2016, 28) put it, “While the coup in itself was indeed a blow to Turkey’s 
democratic credentials, Erdoğan’s response also unequivocally failed the democracy test”. 
The judiciary has been tamed and the opposition parties have either been marginalised (CHP 
- Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/Republican People’s Party), co-opted (MHP - Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi/Nationalist Movement Party) or targeted (HDP - Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi/Peoples’ Democratic Party). Indeed, the co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish HDP remain in 
prison awaiting an uncertain fate. Municipal governors of many Kurdish-majority cities and 
districts have also been arrested and their posts filled by pro-government administrators.  
 
Most significantly of all, the crisis and the state of emergency presented Erdoğan with the 
opportunity fundamentally to reorder the political system to his benefit, in a manner perhaps 
unprecedented in the Turkish Republic’s near 100-year history. Seizing the moment of crisis 
to advance his long-term vision of replacing Turkey’s parliamentary system with an 
executive presidency with virtually untrammelled power, Erdoğan has championed 
fundamental revisions to the constitutions. According to the new constitution, the President 
has the ability to re-design all the ministries, public institutions and state apparatuses by 
issuing a simple presidential decree. Therefore, with the new form of the constitution, the 
Presidential decrees have become one of the fundamental norms of the new regime. Despite 
allegations of serious vote rigging, blunders by the High Election Council and strong 
evidence of undemocratic practices in the run-up to the vote, the changes President Erdoğan 
sought were narrowly approved by the voters in the April 2017 referendum (Öztürk and 
Gözaydın 2017). 
 
Under these circumstances, many Turkish citizens, primarily secular Turks, Kurds, Alevis, 
and Gülenists are fleeing or migrating to Greece and other European countries. Some are 
applying for asylum while others are buying property to obtain residence permits.
1
 According 
                                                 
1
 This data is based on statistics released by the Bank of Greece (BOG), cited in Grekodom.com 2017.  
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to official Greek reports, after the coup attempt in Turkey more than 5000 Turkish citizens 
applied for asylum in Greece (sputniknews.com 2018). Most of the asylum seekers are either 
members or are accused of being members of the Gülen Movement, held responsible for 
plotting the coup attempt (Weise 2018).  
 
White collar Turkish citizens are also leaving Turkey. As Baser and Korkmaz put it:  
Many people in the opposition think the rule of law is being eroded, that elections are 
not fair, that secularism is being replaced by a creeping Islamism (especially in the 
education sector), and that their lifestyles are in danger. As long as this disaffection 
persists, more emigration from Turkey to the West seems inevitable. And if the result 
is a steady outflow of privileged, educated citizens, it might cause a significant brain 
drain, with severe long-term consequences for Turkey’s society and economy.  
 
In 2017, around 3000 visa applications were made to the UK to benefit from the special 
agreement for Turkish entrepreneurs between the UK and Turkey called the Ankara 
Agreement (migrantsrights.org 2018). More than 3000 Turks also filed asylum applications 
in Germany in the same year (DW.com. 2018). Although it seems like Greece is not the first 
choice for Turkish migrants, it still is one of the Western countries receiving recent waves of 
Turkish migration for a variety of reasons including cultural and geographical proximity as 
well as golden visa opportunities (Immigration.ca n.d). This means that apart from concerns 
for Greece at the diplomatic level, Turkey’s domestic issues will certainly spill-over to 
Greece via migration flows as well.  
 
The political transformation at home has led to a new foreign policy course that has resulted 
in the reconfiguration of attitudes in policymaking circles. Of great importance is the 
European Union’s stance on Turkey’s membership process and the efforts made by the AKP 
in its first term in power, which the Turkish government regards as insincere. This has led to 
a distancing between the two. Furthermore, the AKP’s ‘geographic imagination’, closely 
linked to developments before and after the Arab uprisings, includes neighbouring countries 
such as Greece, and should be considered part of the ‘normalisation’ of Turkish politics and 
the identity the AKP is trying to construct (Christofis 2018b, 134-135). In the next section, 
we take a close look at the Greek approach to these recent transformations in Turkey.  
 
Greek politics in transition  
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Greek-Turkish relations has always been predominantly “a history of obsessive symbolic and 
pragmatic tensions, a history of repeated and enduring enmity” (Karakatsanis 2014, xi). 
Issues such as Cyprus, or the Imia/Kardak islands, have returned to the political scene with 
full force after a tension-free period in relations between the two countries during the first, 
more liberal period of AKP rule. The current moment of crisis and instability in Turkey has 
had both direct and indirect impacts on Greece, and all have been exacerbated by 
international developments in the West and the Middle East, but also by the domestic, mainly 
economic, crisis in Greece. Present-day conditions mark a new era in the relations of the two 
countries, an era that is still ‘in progress’. 
Most relevant to our discussion here is that the present Turkish crisis has put the Greek 
coalition government, especially the left-leaning Syriza, in a difficult position. The two 
parties that comprise the current coalition face different constraints and incentives regarding 
Turkish issues and this messy political reality makes navigating the current instability even 
more difficult than it would ordinarily be for an administration that has only just managed to 
find its feet in the wake of the Greek government debt crisis. 
Syriza’s fortunes shifted dramatically in 2009 in the wake of the financial crisis. The party’s 
uncompromising stance on conditionality and the memoranda brought an air of optimism to 
Greek society, after an unstable period in which the older parties seemed unable to act in the 
national interest (Christofis 2014, 49). The crisis reached a peak in Greece in 2010, when the 
first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed, marking at the same time a crack in 
the coalition government formed by the right-wing ND, PASOK, and the centre-left DIMAR 
(Dimokratiki Aristera/Democratic Left). In the January 2015 elections, Syriza’s vote share 
vaulted to 36.3 percent, and it formed a coalition government with the Anel, the populist 
radical right spinoff from ND.
2
 Fresh elections held in September of the same year produced 
the same result: Syriza took 35.5 percent of the vote and its coalition government with Anel 
continued (Aslanidis and Lefkofridi 2013, 28).  
By claiming ownership of the issue gaps left by the major parties (Norris 2005, 6-7), and 
zeroing in on other factors (Spourdalakis 2016) – notably, the economic crisis (Ovenden 
2015) – the Party of the Left claimed 149 seats in the elections. The party consistently 
countered the ‘TINA’ (There Is No Alternative) orthodoxy by arguing that austerity could be 
                                                 
2
 Born a couple of months before the 2012 election, Anel managed to garner an impressive 10.6 percent of the 
votes. Despite a decline to 7.51 percent in the follow-up June election, the wound Anel inflicted on ND’s right 
flank is still draining the lifeblood out of the former bastion of the centre-right (Aslanidis and Lefkofridi 2013). 
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fought from within the euro area, a position that signified a rupture with the corrupt political elite 
and its party-oligarchy comprising PASOK and ND.  
While seeking to take a broad brush to the corrupt status quo at home, Syriza’s position on 
most foreign policy questions was both moderate and EU-centred. Comprising members from 
across the spectrum of the Left, the party is staunch believer in the EU. Its pre-election policy 
position made this point clearly: “Syriza is not a force of Euroscepticism and rejects the rise 
of nationalism as a response to the policies of the EU” (Syriza 2015; Tziampiris 2017).  
The party opposed the so-called Grexit scenario. In particular, following the 5 July 2015 
referendum in Greece, Tsipras rejected the ‘in or out’ dilemma, and stated: “Greece is, and 
will remain an indispensable part of Europe, and Europe, an indispensable part of Greece. 
But Greece without democracy is a Europe without identity or a compass” (Michalopoulos 
2015). The way in which Syriza’s campaigning and electoral victory threw into sharp relief 
the much broader debates about the direction of the European project triggered by the crisis is 
captured by Mazower (2015): “Syriza’s [January 2015] victory stood not for a repudiation of 
Europe, but for a redefinition of it.” 
Having campaigned in poetry, the challenge of governing in prose meant that Syriza had to 
make tough choices. Despite its electoral triumph, Syriza was left with a limited range of 
options as the party was bound not to join the ‘pro-Memoranda’ bloc. At the outset, the KKE 
(Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas/Communist Party of Greece) rejected any coalition 
proposal from Syriza, leaving it two choices: Anel and To Potami (The River). The latter was 
formed in 2014 in response to the crisis, but it championed reform and its take on the 
memoranda was ambiguous, so Syriza chose Anel as a governing partner instead.  
For its part, Anel has been very adaptive in this new partnership with Syriza and effectively 
prevented occasional misunderstandings from ruining the partnership, which is however not 
without obstacles. While, for example, Anel were not comfortable with the ‘open borders’ 
outlook on the refugee question advocated by various Syriza affiliates, they did not protest 
openly. Instead, the party called for Migration Policy Minister Ioannis Mouzalas’s 
resignation because of his reference to Greece’s northern neighbour as ‘Macedonia’ rather 
than ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/FYROM’, an issue that has been brought 




 Furthermore, Anel has taken the recent Turkish instability as cause to 
publicly rebuke the country as a constant threat to its neighbours. While Greeks no doubt are 
generally in agreement, the party’s aggressive, xenophobic rhetoric sometimes puts Syriza in 
a tight spot. Syriza does not govern alone, and as such, aligning party rhetoric with 
government rhetoric and diplomatic practice has proven a challenge. Nevertheless, as Petsinis 
(2017) rightly comments, “Anel have turned out to be very efficient in inventing ways to 
maintain the status quo with Syriza.”  
Syriza’s foreign policy 
Syriza has traditionally hewed to a political vision that stresses Marxist ideology and anti-
imperialism, especially on questions of global political economy and geopolitics. The party 
platform had always championed Greece leaving NATO (eschewing military alliances in 
general) so as to avoid foreign military entanglements in the pursuit of an independent, 
peaceful foreign policy (Synaspismos 2009). When Nikos Kotzias, a qualified and 
experienced diplomat and professor of international relations, was appointed as foreign 
minister, it “led immediately to sensationalist, Cold War headlines about Athens going over 
to Moscow” (Ovenden 2015). Yet, the Syriza–Anel coalition has not moved over to the 
‘Moscow axis’. On the contrary, it has demonstrated a ‘mainstream’ foreign policy on some 
issues, resembling partly that of its predecessors, while on others, such as its opposition to 
sanctions against Russia regarding Crimea (Walker 2015), or China on human rights 
(Emmott and Koutantou  2017), it seems to have broken away from the mainstream, while 
adopting a rhetorical stance in relation to matters that match its commitment to fiscal 
prudence (Neuger and Chrepa 2015).  
In that respect, Kotzias presents no radical ideology; his policy orientation has always been 
realist and pragmatic, with a very orthodox reading of Greek foreign policy doctrine 
(Christofis and Logotheti 2018) particularly regarding the Middle East and the eastern 
Mediterranean.  His public comments soon after taking office demonstrate this continuity in 
Greek state policy (Cfr Ker-Lindsey 2007). He stressed Greece’s geopolitical importance in 
the Balkans and the Mediterranean, yet warned that “[t]here will be millions of migrants and 
thousands of jihadists flocking into Europe if the Greek economy crumbles” (Chrysopoulos 
                                                 
3
 In October 2018, the ‘Macedonian question’ led once again to friction, this time between Foreign Minister 
Kotzias (Syriza) and Defence Minister Panos Kammenos (Anel), and resulted in the former’s resignation. 
Tsipras’ support for Kammenos shows, at least to these authors, that political cost and pragmatism come before 
ideological agendas, as the resignation of Kammenos would have led to early elections and, probably, to Syriza 
losing the elections (Strickland 2018).   
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2015). In the party’s analysis, Greece had become a ‘colony of debt’. Before coming to 
office, Kotzias himself had stressed the imperative to shift the status quo fundamentally: 
Having the country getting rid of the memoranda constitutes a prerequisite for a 
new foreign policy, multidimensional and proactive, which will protect the 
interests of the Greek people. And the other way ‘round, a foreign policy that will 
give again to the country its own voice in international matters, is necessary for 
the country and people to get rid of a colony of debt regime (Tziampiris 2017, 
262). 
 
This ultimate objective of this approach was the restoration of Greek national sovereignty 
through a final settlement with Greece’s creditors that would completely overturn the status 
quo. Such an agreement would acknowledge the social ills caused by austerity, foster pro-
growth policies and deal realistically with Greece’s ruinous and seemingly unsustainable debt 
burden (Tziampiris 2017, 262). 
Syriza’s foreign policy goals were characterized by a reformist zeal and were arguably 
motivated by an idealism that right would eventually trump might. But since 2009, crisis has 
sucked virtually all other oxygen out of the room, leaving governments no alternative but to 
focus almost exclusively on economic management and recovery. The Syriza-led government 
is no exception. In his famous campaign speech in Thessaloniki – the so-called ‘Thessaloniki 
Manifesto’ that led to Syriza’s January 2015 electoral triumph – Tsipras devoted literally one 
line to foreign policy:  
Only with an active and multidimensional foreign policy will [Greece] be able to 
safeguard its interests, leaving behind both the role of the docile student and the 
‘agent’ of Germany's interests, a role that happily Samaras and Venizelos took 
over (Tsipras’ Speech 2014). 
 
A foreign policy agenda was published shortly after Syriza assumed power but it clearly 
showed the limits the new government faced. The policy effectively held “the government 
hostage [to] a national interest that allows strategic manoeuvres but not radical deviations 
from a carefully designed eternal national plan neither apt nor proper to redefine” (Christofis 
and Logotheti 2018). A fundamental divide between rhetoric and practice thus opened up: the 
latter was driven by the traditional motivations and ideological grounding of the party, the 
latter by the insuperable weight of “the national interest” (Christofis and Logotheti 2018, 
107). 
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Syriza’s foreign policy has thus been fundamentally structured by the dictates of economic 
policy in the context of rolling crises. More specifically, as Tziampiris asserts, Greek foreign 
policy has had to pursue three objectives simultaneously: 1) seek the best possible outcome in 
anti-austerity negotiations, partly by reminding creditor nations of the geopolitical 
importance of Greek stability in a turbulent region and of the country’s existing institutional 
powers within the EU; 2) lay out available alternative contingencies in the event of an 
involuntary and abrupt Greek exit from the Eurozone; and 3) contribute to a new multifaceted 
diplomacy involving an extended range of states and international partners (Tziampiris 2017, 
263).  
The most compelling explanation for Syriza’s apparent change of heart is therefore the 
simple logic that, on coming to power, the demands of governance naturally tend to tame the 
more ‘radical’ elements of political parties of either persuasion. Of course, at the rhetorical 
level both Syriza and Anel have maintained their respective ideological-rhetorical stances, 
especially at party congresses and other intra-party meetings. As a matter of public 
administration, however, practice has clearly reflected the need to stabilise the system and set 
the country on the path to recovery. Within Syriza, the politics of crisis has meant that the 
voices of reason and prudence have prevailed, excluding at the same time the moderate, anti-
nationalist fractions (Heraclides 2017).  
Turkey in Syriza’s rhetoric 
Recent conditions present new terrain for the Greek coalition government, and perhaps more 
for the Syriza party. In opposition, Syriza could criticize government decisions without cost. 
A case in point was the period during the Gezi protests in Istanbul in 2013, which many party 
members presented as “an uprising for democracy, freedom and dignity” in the face of 
Erdoğan’s program of “barbaric neoliberal development and competitiveness” (NewsBeast 
2013). 
The picture changed drastically, however, once Syriza came to power. The most revealing 
example of this was during the Turkish general elections of June 2015, the results of which 
posed new challenges for the Greek government. For the first time, the Turkish elections 
marked the entrance of a pro-Kurdish, leftist party – the HDP, which took 13 percent of the 
vote – in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Tekdemir 2016). Before this date, pro-
Kurdish parties had participated in elections with independent candidates in order not to risk 
not passing the 10 percent threshold. The Turkish government responded with a criminalising 
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discourse against the HDP, accusing them of supporting terrorism, which caused uneasiness 
in Syriza.  
As Tekdemir (2016, 6) explains, the AKP and HDP compete for hegemony over the Kurdish 
population, especially in Southern Turkey:  
The HDP’s left-leaning (inclusive, pluralist and emancipatory) populism can 
be contrasted with the AKP’s right-wing (exclusive, monist and authoritarian) 
populist articulation and is clearly distinguishable by the nature of their 
definitions of ‘the People’ (citizenship), democracy and secularism, although 
they share similarities in the way they deploy the core concepts of populism to 
achieve hegemony. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the once political partners during the peace process in Turkey 
were in competition to receive Kurdish votes. HDP’s presence in the Turkish Parliament 
posed a significant problem for the AKP to reach the number of seats needed to form a 
majority government. As O’Connor and Baser (2018, 60) put it:  
Considering that one of the HDP’s election campaign slogans was ‘We will not make 
you the President!’ (referring to Erdoğan), it is obvious that the elections were seen as 
critical for constitutional change in Turkey. Therefore, the competition was not solely 
for seats but rather the power to fundamentally restructure Turkey’s political 
institutions.  
 
After the collapse of the peace process in 2015, the AKP’s discourse towards the HDP started 
to change drastically from that of a conventional ally to constantly accusing the HDP for 
having organic links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). 
The close ties between the Greek Left and the Kurdish movement go way back, without 
however being free from frictions and tensions, as with the Abdullah Öcalan case 
(Karakatsanis 2014, 105-135). Good relations were evident in the exchange of visits and 
letters of support, something that continued with the HDP during the Syriza-led government. 
For example, on 23 May 2015, Yiannis Bournous, a member of the political committee of the 
party, represented Syriza at an HDP election rally in Izmir, a visit that led to the arrest of 
seven HDP members.
4
 Bournous had expressed Syriza’s support for the HDP, and called for 
solidarity with oppressed peoples to protect the region from chauvinist and extremist 
tendencies (Avgi 2015).  
                                                 
4
 Interview with Yiannis Bournous by Nikos Christofis and Amaryllis Logotheti, Athens, Greece, 23 November 
2016. 
 14 
Soon after, HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş returned the favour and, during an unofficial 
visit to Athens, thanked the Greek prime minister for his support of the HDP (Left.gr 2016a). 
In October of the same year, Syriza officially invited its fellow traveller on the Left to 
participate as an observer in the party’s second congress. This clearly signalled that Syriza 
considers the HDP a progressive, democratic and leftist force in the world on a par with itself 
(Left.gr 2016b). 
The extreme violence against the Kurds, and the imprisonment of most of the Kurdish leaders 
in the following months, led to a series of statements by the Greek left parties, including 
Syriza, criticizing AKP policies. A large demonstration was held in the Syntagma square in 
solidarity with the Kurdish people (Left.gr 2016c). On the other hand, the Greek government 
refrained from issuing a statement condemning the alleged accusations against the Kurdish 
leaders. This came as no surprise as other countries had also refrained from officially taking a 
stance against the illiberal policies of the AKP. Such an act would rightly be considered an 
interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign country, with severe repercussions on 
diplomatic relations. This silence, however, allowed Erdoğan to crack down on Turkish 
political institutions, civil society and academia with impunity “because European leaders 
were unable to face their own demons of racism, Islamophobia, human rights violations and 
sheer egotism” (Benhabib 2017). This did not remain unnoticed by the Greek left. Another 
case in point is the conclusion of the agreement on migration between Turkey and the EU on 
18 March 2016; both countries presented the agreement as a panacea for Europe’s migrant 
crisis (European Council 2016). 
The steady repression by the Turkish authorities and government targeting the Kurds seems 
to have had some effect on Syriza’s approach. The party – and the entire coalition 
government for that matter – has noticeably reduced the frequency of public statements of 
support for the HDP and relations appear to have cooled, at least on the face of it. Arguably 
this may be a carefully played policy by the Greek government to avoid antagonizing the 
Turkish government and creating further tensions between the two countries. Nevertheless, 
considering the case of the eight Turkish officers and other issues, Kotzias’ rather impolitic 
statement that “the Kurds should have those rights that the Republic of Cyprus intends to give 
to the Turkish Cypriot community” (HellasJournal 2017) could easily have caused friction 
and tension in relations between the two countries.  
Implications: Turkish-Greek relations in the new situation 
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Drawing on the foregoing analysis, we can now sketch out some of the implications for future 
Greek–Turkish relations, focusing particularly on the issues of asylum seekers and recent 
Turkish revisionism on the Lausanne issue. 
Greek–Turkish relations have always been somewhat fragile. Historical enmity is a factor, 
but the circumstances at the foundation of the Turkish Republic have provided much of the 
animus between the two countries over the past 100 years or so. As Couloumbis and 
Kentikelenis (2007, 517) wrote, “for long, the Greek-Turkish space had been characterized as 
a volcanic zone that was expected to erupt into generalized warfare at anytime, anywhere 
between the Aegean and Cyprus”. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 or alleged Greek 
support for the PKK deteriorated relations between the two countries (Couloumbis and 
Kentikelenis 2007). At the end of the 1990s, however, the so-called “earthquake diplomacy” 
(Carkoglu and Kirisci 2004) in the wake of the 1999 disaster in Turkey brought the erstwhile 
adversaries together, starting a period of normalisation that has continued without any actual 
confrontation between the two countries since then. Diplomacy has focused mainly on issues 
of ‘low politics’ rather than ‘high politics’, keeping essential and crucial issues that have been 
haunting bilateral relations for decades off the agenda (Raptopoulos 2017, 120).  At the same 
time, Turkey’s foreign policy problems with Greece have lost their priority on the Turkish 
political agenda as the conflicts in the Middle East have occupied Turkish policymakers 
during the last decade.
5
 Even though, relations continue to be marred in the Aegean, 
especially as concerns air space. Dogfights and other tensions still occur and sometimes have 
the potential to escalate depending on the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the two 
countries (Larrabee 2012, 473).  
Indeed, recent developments demonstrate that, during times of crisis, old enmities and 
disputes have a way of resurfacing and familiar tensions are simply reframed in terms of the 
latest context. Immediately after the coup attempt, Tziampiris (2016) warned that “Greece 
now has a neighbour that is more divided, isolated and weak. The last thing that Athens 
should do is provide an excuse to Ankara to turn its domestic challenges into a dispute with 
Greece”. In his opinion, it was the Kemalist elites that had kept Turkish-Greek relations in a 
poor state for many years; Islamists, therefore, might have a different approach.  
                                                 
5
 A full account is not possible, however it should be noted that Turkey’s foreign policy agenda has prioritised 
issues related to Syria, Israel-Palestine and Iraq during the AKP period. For more information, see Tezcur and 
Grigorescu 2014.  
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However, the aftermath of the putsch has shown that Turkish ruling elites are compelled to 
act in a certain way to galvanize nationalist feelings and give the impression both to the 
outside world and to its own supporters that Turkey is still strong. Furthermore, the Turkish 
government was angered by the fact that Greece did not cooperate regarding the deportation 
of military personnel who had allegedly taken part in the coup attempt in Turkey and 
subsequently sought political asylum in Greece. This issue then led to other crises, such as 
the Lausanne debate and the Kardak issue as will be detailed below.  
The case of the Eight 
No sooner had the coup been put down, than the Greek government found itself caught up in 
a thorny political issue that rekindled mutual mistrust between the two countries. On the 
morning of 16 July 2016, eight Turkish military personnel fled to Greece by means of a 
military helicopter – which had been used during the coup attempt itself – and immediately 
sought political asylum. Once the actions of the officers were revealed, Turkey’s foreign 
minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, immediately requested that Athens return them to Turkey to face 
justice. A Greek government spokeswoman announced that the helicopter would be returned 
right away but that the officers’ asylum claims would have to proceed according to 
international law. In a somewhat bizarre turn of events, a Greek court then handed down a 
two-month suspended prison sentence to the eight military personnel for illegal entry into the 
country. In the midst of all the tension and exchange of official statements between the Greek 
and Turkish governments, Erdoğan openly mulled over reinstating the death penalty, an issue 
that bears directly on the refugee status of the eight soldiers concerned. Under Greek or 
international law, the existence of the threat of a death penalty for an asylum seeker in their 
homeland might further complicate how asylum cases are being handled.  
With Turkey’s demand that ‘the eight’, as they came to be known, be extradited, the Greek 
government was handed a ticking political bomb. The Greek administration, however, did not 
miss a beat and Deputy Foreign Minister, Yiannis Amanatidis, issued a statement assuring all 
interested parties that the case of the eight would be fast-tracked, but repeating that the Greek 
government’s stance was that the case must proceed according to Greek and international 
law. As Triantaphyllou (2017) wrote; 
 
The decision of the Greek Supreme Court to deny the extradition of 8 military officers 
that sought refuge in Greece after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey not only 
brought about the ire of Turkey with possible negative consequences in bilateral 
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relations; it also had the support of a vocal segment of Greek civil society that took a 
public stand against the extradition on human rights grounds. 
 
Çavuşoğlu stated that Greece had already agreed to extradite these men, a claim that his 
Greek counterpart, Kotzias, publicly refuted. At the same time, Tsipras phoned Erdoğan to 
confirm that the Greek side would do ‘whatever necessary’ to ensure the extradition of the 
eight. In another phone call with Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, Tsipras said that Greek 
authorities had already commenced the extradition process and later he reassured the Turkish 
authorities that “there was no room for coups in democracies, and the Greek government 
stood by and respected the elected government of Turkey and the will of the Turkish nation” 
(Daily Sabah 2016). 
The same opinion was expressed by Kotzias in one of his rare interviews:  
Politically, we condemn any type of coup, and we would be the last country – 
and especially the Greek Left – that could accept or tolerate a military coup. 
On the other hand, who is or isn't a putschist – and whether he has or will have 
a fair trial in Turkey or not and has fled to Greece – is decided by the Greek 
courts. The political condemnation of the coup does not entail that every 
Turkish citizen accused by Ankara of being a putschist is necessarily found to 
be so by the Greek courts (Kotzias Interview, 2017).  
The issue also caused frictions within the Party of the Left itself and its supporters when the 
Syriza member of parliament Eleni Avlonitou agreed with Olga Yerovasili, the government 
spokesperson, and the deputy minister of national defence, Dimitris Vitsas, who had 
expressed their opposition to the granting of asylum to the eight. Avlonitou argued that the 
eight officers had been involved in crimes against humanity: ‘Justice will decide but the 
Greek Justice cannot provide asylum to people who were shooting and bombing 
indiscriminately citizens by air a week ago’ (ThePressProject 2016).6 The discussions on the 
issue caused further agitation to the supporters of Syriza who were by that time decreasing 
considerably in numbers, as there was a high risk of Turkey bringing back the death penalty. 
 
Up to this point, the handling of the situation by the Greek government was based on Greek 
and international laws. It was for the Greek court to decide the fate of the eight. Although 
Tsipras often stated that coup perpetrators are not welcome in Greece, the Supreme Court of 
Greece rejected the extradition requests by Turkey and the asylum requests of the eight 
soldiers were approved in 2017. Nevertheless, the Greek government contested this decision 
                                                 
6
 Interestingly, Avlonitou’s statement is nowhere to be found in the news website of the Syriza newspaper, Avgi. 
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and filed a request for cancellation of the asylum status to the soldiers (Reuters 2017). Even 
though the government was clearly yielding to Turkish and potentially other pressures to 
extradite these soldiers, the independent justice system functioned above these diplomatic 
issues. As a result of the asylum case, Turkey suspended its bilateral migrant readmission 
deal with Greece in June 2018 (Hurriyet Daily News 2018) and Turkish Foreign Minister 
Çavuşoğlu stated that Turkey will keep pressuring Greece on this issue in the future 
(Euronews 2018) 
 
However, some news agencies such as Worldwide Movement for Human Rights reported in 
May 2017 that Greece has actually returned various asylum seekers to Turkey, including a 
journalist, Murat Çapan, from Nokta magazine. The Hellenic League of Human Rights 
(HLHR) claimed that the Greek police handed Çapan over to masked men who took him 
back to Turkey for imprisonment. Greek authorities rejected any involvement (Worldwide 
Movement for Human Rights 2017). The Middle East Eye (2017) also reported a second 
incident in which a group of Turkish asylum seekers were deported to Turkey in the company 
of masked men. The Greek Ombudsman’s department for Human Rights has launched an 
investigation into the matter, and the HLHR has filed a complaint to the Greek Supreme 
Court (Middle East Eye 2017). They also made the following declaration:  
The refoulement to the Turkish authorities of people that are in danger of severe 
violations of their most basic human rights, if it has indeed taken place, is a blatant 
violation of international law and it is clear it was not the initiative of the local police 
force. We demand the immediate investigation of the incident and concrete answers 
from the relevant ministers concerning the policy that is in effect at the borders. The 
Hellenic League for Human Rights has already sent an official notice to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees demanding the investigation of the incident 
(Worldwide Movement for Human Rights 2017). 
 
The UNHCR and the Council of Europe’s Human Rights commissioner declared their 
concern over these allegations (Ibid).  
 
The Lausanne debate 
A few months after the putsch, the Greek government was drawn into another difficult 
situation, this one related to Lausanne revisionism. Since the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923, the Turkish elite has defined Turkey’s national goals according to the 
needs of the Kemalist project: the creation of a new, Western-oriented nation and state, 
respecting the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), which the national borders of the Republic were 
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defined by the National Assembly in 1920. In that respect, the obligations arising from the 
Treaty of Lausanne, the final treaty concluding World War I, was signed in Lausanne, 
Switzerland, on 24 July 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Treaty of Sèvres and have 
often been respected internationally. Furthermore, it officially settled the conflict between the 
Ottoman Empire and Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Romania after World War I. 
Furthermore, it secured the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey after the War of 
Independence (1919-22).  
The conflict between Ankara and Baghdad over Turkey’s role in the liberation of Mosul 
(Iraq) had precipitated an alarming burst of Turkish irredentism, indirectly dragging Greece 
into the melee. Erdoğan, on two separate occasions, criticized the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
created the borders of modern Turkey, for leaving the country too small (Danforth 2016). On 
29 September 2016, Erdoğan made a statement saying “although some tried to deceive us by 
presenting Lausanne as victory, in Lausanne, we gave away the islands that you could shout 
across to”, referring to Greek islands located in the Aegean Sea close to the Turkish coastline. 
Furthermore, in the same speech, Erdoğan claimed that “if this coup had succeeded, they 
would have given us a treaty that would have made us long for Sèvres” referring to the pact 
that preceded the Treaty of Lausanne in 1920, abolishing the Ottoman Empire. According to 
Erdoğan, Turkey is still struggling with the delimitation of its continental shelf, as well as its 
air and land borders.  Erdoğan’s statements alarmed the Greek government, as well as the 
Greek people, whose constructed memories of the ‘vicious’ and ‘expansionist’ Turks were 
revived and subsequently dominated public discussions. The Greek government was again 
put in a difficult spot, that is how to establish a balance between public opinion and its leftist 
agenda.  
Instantly, without being stated outright, the statements brought to the fore a number of old 
intercommunal issues that have yet to be resolved. These include the rights of the Greek 
Orthodox minority in Turkey and the pressures exerted upon minorities in general in Turkey, 
the state orchestrated pogrom against the Rum population in Istanbul in September 1955, and 
other incidents engraved in the Greek people’s national identity. The Greek opposition parties 
tried to instrumentalise these grievances for political gain. But the Turkish president’s 
statement received negative reactions from Turkish and international experts, as well as from 
the Greek government. Through its new spokesperson, Dimitris Tzanakopoulos, the Greek 
government responded calmly that the Greek position on this issue was in line with the 
international community (Naftemporiki 2017). Making a rather dangerous joke however, 
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during the presentation of a book entitled Imvros-Tenedos (Gökçeada-Bozcaada in Turkish), 
on 3 May 2017, Foreign Minister Kotzias, referring to foreign policy issues, stated that after 
the Treaty of Sèvres, there was the revised Treaty of Lausanne, “Therefore, I am telling 
Erdoğan that if he does not like the Treaty of Lausanne, there is always the Treaty of Sèvres” 
(Tribune 2017). Kotzias continued however, by stating that “the Turks are used to hit at their 
opponents when they think they are weak”, perpetuating a negative stereotype of the 
belligerent Turk. Such statements, coming from the institution par excellence of a country’s 
foreign policy, and its highest representative, contribute to polarizing society, as national 
discourse is built on the core concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’; concepts that see the other, in 
this case Turkey, as the ‘eternal’ enemy (Waever 2002).  
Erdoğan’s visit to Greece in early December 2017 was also remarkable with regard to 
reviving the discussions around Lausanne. Although the visit of a Turkish President to 
Greece after 65 years may seem like a positive development, the visit was not amicable 
throughout. Moreover, the visit, among other reasons, took place as a continuation of 
previous exchanges of visits between Greek and Turkish officials. On the first day of the 
historic visit, Erdoğan made comments regarding modernising the treaty. Greek President 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos responded: “The Treaty of Lausanne defines the territory and the 
sovereignty of Greece, and of the European Union, and this treaty is non-negotiable. It has no 
flaws, it does not need to be reviewed, or updated” (Tsiliopoulos 2017). 
It is important to point out that internal debates clearly show that there is no consensus on the 
Lausanne question in Turkey’s political circles. CHP’s leaders also criticized Erdoğan’s 
remarks about the treaty, as they tend to see this treaty as a victory of the Early Republic 
rather than a concession to foreign powers. The AKP’s populist discourse regarding the 
‘Kemalist legacy’ can instead be interpreted as a way of delegitimizing ‘old Turkey’s 
national myths’ by replacing them with new ones during the creation of AKP’s ‘new Turkey’ 
(Cfr Christofis 2018a). Therefore the tensions between Greece and Turkey over this issue can 




However, another incident occurred just as the Lausanne issue was breaking. Turkey and 
Greece were forced to ‘relive’ an earlier bout of tension, the Imia (Turkish: Kardak) island 
crisis of 1996. On 21 January 2017, at that time the Turkish Chief of General Staff, Hulusi 
                                                 
7




, paid a visit to the island and during his visit noted that the Turkish military was an 
effective, dissuasive and prestigious power in the region. Immediately after his visit, media 
outlets in Turkey interpreted this as a threat to Greece after the issue of the eight and the 
Lausanne debacle. In response, some of the Greek media outlets, such as the right-wing 
Dimokratia declared: “The enemy is at the door” (Çandar 2017). Even though the Turkish 
General’s behaviour was deemed benign, it had a direct link with the putsch and was a 
political message to Greece. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we discussed the impact of Turkey’s political transformation on its neighbour, 
Greece. By specifically focusing on the Greek perspective on certain issues, we looked at 
how Turkey’s troubles are affecting Greek-Turkish relations and what fault lines have been 
moved by recent developments. More theoretically speaking, it underlines that Turkey’s 
authoritarian turn is directly affecting its foreign policy behaviours and strategies, as the 
constructivist school suggests. We argued that Greece is also going through a transformation 
under Syriza’s coalition government and therefore has, at times, responded in an unorthodox 
manner to Turkey’s actions. The two countries’ bilateral relations are largely dependent on 
respective domestic policies, but they are also determined by and they determine the 
international political atmosphere as well, especially with regard to EU politics as a common 
ground. Further research on this topic might investigate how Turkey’s transformation is 
affecting its diplomatic relations with other neighbours to compare the diffusion mechanisms 
of domestic tensions outside its borders. 
 
This article has shown that Turkey’s internal problems are spilling over to Greece via several 
highly visible issues such as the eight asylum seekers who were part of the coup attempt, the 
Lausanne debate, the brief flare-up over Imia/Kardak, as well as the incipient but growing 
Turkish diaspora in Greece. Recent developments have shown that the dormant tensions or 
so-called ‘ancient hatreds’ between the two countries can still affect political discourses and 
be brought to surface whenever deemed handy, also triggering military-security dilemmas on 
occasion. At the moment, these recent tensions seem to be causing only minor strains, 
                                                 
8
 Hulusi Akar is the current Turkish Minister of Defence and a former four-star Turkish Armed Forces general 
who served as the 29th Chief of the General Staff. 
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considering the state of Turkish-Greek relations two decades ago. However, it can be argued 
that Turkey’s domestic political environment; ethno-religious (Sunni Turkishness) identity 
shift and increasing authoritarianism is having an impact on Greece. Firstly, Greece is likely 
to be receiving more and more asylum or settlement applications from Turkey. Secondly, 
Turkey’s relationship with Greece is multifaceted: at times, Turkey’s actions are directed 
only at Greek politicians and at other times Turkey sends messages to the EU via Greece, as 
in the case of the EU-Turkey refugee deal. Third, Turkish, but also Greek politicians have 
made a habit of using nationalist rhetoric when they need to legitimate certain unpopular 
policy decisions. Therefore, Greece will have to adapt itself to its rapidly transforming 
neighbour and, while providing a bridge between the EU and Turkey, it will have to try not to 
be agitated by Turkish politicians’ provocative remarks on issues that were thought long 
dead, if not buried. 
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